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It is hard to conceive of an environmental disaster with greater capacity for harm than 
a nuclear accident. The (still projected) costs related to the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
may run to 21.5 trillion yen ($188 billion), of which over one third (7.9 trillion yen) is 
accounted for by reparation and compensation with a further quarter (5.6 trillion yen) 
for the cost of treatment and storage of contaminated soil (Yasunari 2011; Obayashi 
and Hamada 2016). These costs in Japan, lying outside of any compensation regime, 
fall largely upon Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) and other utilities and are borne by 
cost cutting (and a return to hydrocarbon based energy) and higher utility bills. In 
Western Europe, international conventions provide for an international liability 
regime
1
 for the payment of compensation following a nuclear incident (Touitou-
Durand, 2010). Recent changes to and in particular raised liability thresholds in these 
international conventions have ge erated revised compensation structures for nuclear 
accidents in the UK. 
The Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damages) Order 2016
2
 (‘2016 Order’) amends 
the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (‘1965 Act’) in order to comply with amended 
protocols3 to the Paris4 and Brussels Supplementary5 Conventions (McRae, 1998). 
The 1965 Act implements a strict liability regime on operators of nuclear licensed 
sites for injury or damage caused by a nuclear occurrence.  Operators are required to 
put in place insurance or other provision to cover this liability. The changes made to 
this regime by the Order are wide ranging. For example, disposal sites for nuclear 
waste are brought within the regime. More potential claimants, including those 
suffering damage in a non-convention state with no nuclear installations, can claim up 
to the Convention limits. These liability caps will rise in a banded fashion, explained 
below, depending on the category of installation, in a move which broadly passes 
responsibility for nuclear damage away from government and more firmly onto the 
nuclear industry. Such a transfer of responsibility constitutes ‘legal channelling’ 
(Trebilcock and Winter, 1997) and is consistent with the world-wide trends relating to 
third party liability for nuclear incidents (Ameye 2010). Limitation periods will 
increase also with an extended limit of 30 years for death and personal injury and 10 
years for other claims6. 
This paper reviews just one area of change introduced by the 2016 Order, namely 
the type of damage for which compensation may be claimed under the 1965 Act 
and the relationship of this notion of damage with that both governed more 
generally by English common law and by EU law more specifically in the field  of 
environmental liability7. The issue of compensation has been of interest to 
international lawyers for some time, especially in the context of the Chernobyl 
disaster (Barron 1986, Levy 1987). The ‘labyrinthine’ international regime (Swartz, 
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2016) in this complex area has developed in response to the limitations of “ordinary 
common law” (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2016). The tort law constraints have 
been highlighted by the UK Government during the consultation on the 2016 Order 
(DECC 2011). Historically, the 1965 Act has governed claims for personal injury 
or property damage arising out of a nuclear incident. To these traditional heads of 
damage are added three new related categories of compensation, These are payable 
in respect of: (i) the cost of measures of reinstatement related to the impaired 
environment; (ii) loss of income deriving from a direct economic interest in any use 
or enjoyment of the environment; and (iii) the cost of preventive measures 
(including measures taken in response to a threatened occurrence, or an “event”) 
and any damage caused by such measures.
8
 These form an exclusive remedy where 
breach of the statutory duties under the 1965 Act has occurred through which 
liability is channelled to the operator as defendant (Thomas and Heffron, 2012). 
The provisions of the 1965 Act concerning the right to compensation are now 
subject to consequential amendments to accommodate these additional categories 
of claim.9  
 
This paper will explain these changes to the liability regime for nuclear installations 
before reviewing the traditional heads of damage under the 1965 Act. It argues that, 
while there is some welcome clarification of what amounts to an ‘occurrence’ the 
purposes of the 1965 Act, disappointingly little else has been done to clarify concepts 
of personal injury and property damage for the purposes of the Act. As things stand, 
such concepts sit alongside traditional tort notions of injury and damage leaving the 
law highly dependent on earlier, but not always consistent, case law. The paper then 
goes on to consider the impact of the new categories of compensation, introduced by 
the Order, evaluating the extent to which these draw upon EU law structures for 
environmental impairment liability. Here too we argue that given limited 
jurisprudence on liability under the Environmental Liability Directive, the precise 
extent of liability is open to doubt. Before turning, then, to the main theme of 
compensation for harm caused by nuclear incidents, the next section offers a short 
introduction to the recent changes made to the liability regime. 
 
Changes to the liability regime for nuclear installations 
 
The Paris and Brussels Conventions allow caps on the liability of an operator arising 
out of any individual incident which results in nuclear damage (Faure and Borre, 
2008). In the UK, an operator will include all licensees operating the licensed site 
under a nuclear site licence. The 2016 Order raises the liability coverage limit of an 
operator of a licensed installation from €170 million to €1,200 million per incident. 
Liability is tiered so that, within the first tier, the operator is strictly liable up to a 
figure of €700m. Thereafter the operator is liable for the next €500m rising in annual 
increments of €100m over five years. The final tier of €300m is payable from public 
funds, contributed by all contracting parties to the Brussels Convention.10 In addition 
to these operator caps, there is a limit of €80m for incidents caused by nuclear 
materials in transit and the regime is extended to cover installations for disposal of 
nuclear material with an enabling power for the Secretary of State to set caps on 
liability. As mentioned above, the limitation period for lodging a claim with respect to 
loss of life or personal injury is extended from ten years to 30 years. All other claims 
are subject to the original limitation period of ten years from the date of the incident11.  
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As originally enacted, the 1965 Act did not extend to nuclear incidents occurring or 
damage suffered in a non-contracting state. Under the amendments to the 1965 Act12, 
the range of potential claimants now includes those located in states that have no 
nuclear installations on their territory at the time of the nuclear incident. States may 
also bring claims if they have in place, at the time of the incident, national nuclear 
liability legislation, which affords equivalent reciprocal benefits; based on the 
principles of the Paris Convention. Therefore, claims brought by claimants domiciled 
in non-Convention States, affected by a nuclear incident in a Convention State such as 
the UK may bring a claim under the 1965 Act regime.  This would include, for 
exam le, a claimant domiciled in Ireland, which is a non-nuclear (and a non-Paris 
Convention) State, who suffers damage from a UK- based nuclear incident and 
pursues a claim in the English courts. However, it remains possible for such a 
claimant to lodge a claim, for example in tort, in the Irish courts. Not only would this 
not be subject to the liability caps but it would work outside the channelled strict 
liability of the operator so that contractors or other potentially liable third parties 
could be sued.  
 
The existing heads of damage: personal injury and property damage 
 
The 1965 Act creates a liability regime, applicable to operators of nuclear licensed 
sites, which imposes strict liability for injury or damage caused by a nuclear 
occurrence, and it requires operators to have in place insurance or other cover to align 
with the liability limits outlined above. Under the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage,
13
 nuclear damage means that the loss or damage 
must have been caused by ionising radiation emitted either in the operator’s nuclear 
installation or during the transport of nuclear substances to or from the installation. 
However, nuclear damage can arise from “the radioactive properties of such matter, or 
from a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous 
properties of such matter.”14 
 
This leaves open, nonetheless, the question of what constitutes property damage for 
the purposes of the Act.  This concept of property damaged by an escape of 
contaminants is well understood in the law of negligence and of nuisance (Smith, III, 
1995)15 but we wish to argue that it can be problematic to apply common law 
principles of physical damage to the consequences of a nuclear accident (Lee, 2000). 
Since the 1965 Act tends to take for granted the concepts of damage or at least rely on 
common law understandings of heads of damage, we are left with uncertainty as to 
the extent of compensation in the nuclear regime.  
 
Clearly land may be the subject of direct physical damage or damage may be caused 
by encroachment upon or in certain nuisance/negligence claims by literally 
undermining the land, or by some other form of direct physical injury to the land itself 
or to property on the land.  In negligence, to establish liability for property damage, 
the claimant landowner will need to establish that the defendant owed a duty of care 
which was breached when the defendant failed do something which a reasonable 
landowner would ordinarily do or did something which a reasonable landowner would 
not do. Historically, in nuisance, where a neighbouring party is responsible for direct 
injury to land there may be little reason to enquire as to the utility of the conduct of 
that party since everyone is bound ‘to use his property in such a manner as not to 
injure the property of his neighbour’16. In effect, the courts may look to the fact of the 
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damage in determining that there has been unreasonable interference with the 
enjoyment of land.17  
 
Beyond physical encroachment and (indirect) physical injury to land, Lord Lloyd in 
Hunter v Canary Wharf added a third category of damage in nuisance which he 
labelled interference with quiet enjoyment of land, but which is often referred to as 
‘amenity loss’ (McBride and Bagshaw, 2015).  Here, in the absence of direct physical 
intervention, and in the realm of “physical discomfort” it is usually necessary to show 
that the activity on neighbouring land, creating the nuisance, is unreasonable in the 
particular locality.18  Note however that this category of amenity loss actually takes 
two forms.  It can give rise to a clear diminution in the amenity value of the property 
throughout the period within which the nuisance exists.  If this is true, then recovery 
of damage for diminution in such value maybe possible.  This must now be contrasted 
with the situation in which, although there is inconvenience and annoyance, there can 
be no proof of loss in the amenity value of the property. In such cases no damages 
will be recoverable either at common law or within the meaning of damage to 
property in section 7(1A)(b) of the 1965 Act.
19
   
 
This means, that in relation to direct physical injury or amenity loss, the appropriate 
sum in damages will then be such as to compensate: in the first category, for any 
physical damage to the land together with any consequential losses flowing from this; 
and, in the second category, any diminution in amenity value of the property for so 
long as the nuisance persists.  In Hunter, Lord Hoffmann puts it this way. 
 
“The land has not suffered ‘sensible injury’, but its utility has been diminished 
by the existence of the nuisance.  It is for an unlawful threat to the utility of his 
land that the possessor or occupier is entitled to an injunction, and it is for that 




There will be cases in which the land has indeed suffered ‘sensible injury’, though 
determining quite what this constitutes is by no means obvious (Witting 2002).
21
 A 
useful starting point for considering this issue in relation to the 1965 Act is the case of 
Merlin v British Nuclear Fuels Plc
22 which involved a claim for diminution in value 
of a house in Ravensglass in proximity to the Sellafield Plant operated by British 
Nuclear Fuels.  The Merlins were unable to sell their house following its appearance 
in a television documentary which indicated that the house was adversely affected by 
radioactive contamination. There were heightened levels of radioactivity around the 
house, which, the Merlins alleged, and BNFL accepted for the purposes of the case, 
originated in waste emitted from the Sellafield Plant. The action by the plaintiffs 
involved a claim that the defendants had breached their duty under section 7(1) of the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965.  This imposes a duty to guard against any occurrence 
involving nuclear matter or ionising radiation emitted from any waste discharge so as 
to cause injury to any person, or damage to any other property. Because the case 
involved a statutory claim under the 1965 Act, there are questions about the 
applicability of the judgment to common law claims in tort. Certainly claims at 
common law seem thereafter to have taken a more extensive approach.  
 
The case did involve certain questions of potential personal injury but while the 
Merlins and their children may have feared heightened levels of risk, particularly risks 
of cancer induced by the inhalation or ingestation of the radionuclides, there was no 
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immediate evidence of any illness or harm having befallen the family.  The issue 
became, therefore, whether the presence of radionuclides within the house, that is 
contained by the walls, ceilings and floors of the property itself, constituted damage. 
Although there were some questions of causation relating to the conduct of the 
plaintiffs and to the impact of the television documentary, in broad terms there was 
little doubt that the impact on the house had rendered it less valuable and clear 
economic loss resulted.  The question was whether those economic losses were 
consequent upon any physical damage to the property.   
 
Gatehouse J rejected “the argument that the contamination at the plaintiffs’ house per 
se amounts to damage to their property.  All that such contamination as was admitted 
in this case amounts to is some increased risk to the health of its occupants”.23  As 
such, and not yet having suffered any health effects, the Merlins had no damage upon 
which to found the claim under s7 of the 1965 Act (Wakeford et al., 1989).  Lest one 
would wish to confine this decision to the narrow basis of a claim under the Nuclear 
Installations Act, it should be said that “damage to property” under that Act is not 
defined, so there is no necessary reason to believe that the definition in the 1965 Act 
was particularly more restrictive than any definition at common law.  However, the 
Merlin case must be considered in the light of a later case concerning radioactive 
contamination, namely Blue Circle Industries Plc v Ministry of Defence. 24 
 
The Blue Circle case also involved the migration of radioactive material, in this case 
from the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston.  This washed out onto the 
land of the plaintiff following heavy rainfall.  An area of marshland on the claimant’s 
land, a large Victorian ‘Manor House’ which operated as a conference centre, was 
contaminated as a result.  Decontamination work was carried out by the Ministry of 
Defence at its own cost.  As it happened, around this time (in 1993) there were 
negotiations for the sale of the conference centre. Once the fact of the contamination 
was disclosed; negotiations fell through and from a possible sale of £10.35m in April 
1993, by the date of trial, the judge estimated the value of the estate at around about 
£5m.  Questions of the calculation of loss are dealt with below but before moving to 
that point, it is necessary to review the treatment of Merlin in the Blue Circle case.  In 
giving judgment in Blue Circle Aldous LJ examined the wording of s7 of the 1965 
Act and stated that it was not limited to particular types of damage: 
 
“Damage within the Act will occur where there is some alteration of the 
physical characteristics of the property, in this case the marshland, caused by 




This has become the accepted notion of property damage for the purposes of the 1965 
Act. The court had little hesitation in stating that the plutonium in the Blue Circle case 
had “intermingled” with the soil in the marsh to such an extent that it could not be 
separated from the soil by any practical process, necessitating remediation by the 
removal of the soil: 
 
“I have no doubt that the addition of plutonium to the topsoil rendered the 
characteristics of the marshland different.”26 
 
This obviously raises the question of how this sits alongside the decision in Merlin.  
In answer to this question his Lordship stated: 
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“In Merlin’s case the dust was in the house and the judge did not hold that the 
house and the radioactive material were so intermingled as to mean that the 




His Lordship does go on to say that “there is no need to decide whether Merlin’s case 
was rightly decided”
28
 on the basis that the cases were distinguishable on their facts. It 
may be that a more satisfactory way of distinguishing these cases is not merely on the 
basis of the intermingling of the waste material as such but because such material lost 
to the soil should be taken as discarded for the purposes of Directive 2008/98/EC (the 
Waste Framework Directive) such that there could be a regulatory requirement for 
remediation under both EU and English law.29  
 
If the basis of the distinction alone is the degree of intermingling of the material, this 
particular point of distinction must be open to some doubt, especially following the 
decision of the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf.30  Amongst the nuisances 
of which the residents of the London Docklands complained in this case, occurring at 
the time of the building of Canary Wharf, was the deposit of dust within their 
properties.  This raised the issue as to whether this might be taken to constitute 
physical damage (such as to give right to an action in negligence) rather than a mere 
amenity loss in nuisance.  The Court of Appeal seemed happy to accept that excessive 
deposits of dust, above and beyond that which might ordinarily be expected, could 
amount to or at least constituted a cause of damage, and that this will be particularly 
so where professional cleaning was required, or where the dust caused a physical 
change in the article which was affected, making it less useful or less valuable.  On 
appeal, the House of Lords do not seem to have disputed or questioned this finding in 
of the Court of Appeal.   
 
On the facts of Merlin, radionuclides were present in the dust in the carpets of the 
house, just as construction dust had affected the residents’ carpets in the London 
Docklands.  Given the risks posed, some specialist cleaning along the lines suggested 
by the Court of Appeal would hardly seem inappropriate in Merlin and the 
interference might be deemed ‘excessive’ within the terms suggested in Hunter.  Even 
allowing for a possible distinction between the contamination in Merlin and that in 
Blue Circle on the basis of regulatory requirements for remediation, it nonetheless 
seems that, in the aftermath of the Hunter case, the Court of Appeal in Blue Circle 
took a much less restrictive view of damage than did Mr Justice Gatehouse in the 
Merlin case. To some extent this is supported in a later case under section 7 of the 
Nuclear Installations Act 1965, arising out of Scotland, in which the analysis in 
Merlin fell to be considered. 
 
In Magnohard Limited v United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)
31
 the 
petitioners owned property alongside the UKAEA power station at Dounreay in the 
north of Scotland.  The first petitioner was a family company which owned an estate 
including a beach and fishing rights and it was joined in the action by various other 
petitioners living close by.  The damage of which the petitioners complained was in 
the form of the presence of particles of nuclear matter on the beach.  It is thought that 
the particles are deposited somewhere at sea, and drawn in by wind and tide to the 
beach.  The first petitioner argued that the presence of such particles represented 
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damage to its land, and the remaining petitioners, local residents, brought claims for 
“anxiety and stress”32 arising out of the presence of the particles.   
 
In this initial action, although the petitioners reserved their right to seek further 
remedies in the future, they sought the following remedies: 
 
• a declaration that UKAEA are failing to perform their statutory duty under 
s7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965; and 
• an interim order requiring UKAEA to implement a programme of 
monitoring and clean-up. 
 
Initially the claimants had sought also a declaration that UKAEA had failed to act in 
compliance with Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, but it was agreed that these arguments would not be pursued at this 
preliminary stage. 
 
The judgment in the case offers a long history of activity at Dounreay.  However, the 
essential issues might be summarised very quickly.  The reprocessing of nuclear fuel 
at Dounreay had ceased.  Routes by which radioactive particles might escape were 
thought to have been closed off.  Nonetheless, it is accepted that particles of nuclear 
matter constituting radioactive waste continued to come ashore onto on Sandside 
Beach.  It seems inevitable that these particles had escaped from the Dounreay site, 
although the date on which and the route by which such escape took place is a matter 
of speculation. The first particle on the beach was detected in 1984.  Nothing was 
found then until 1997 when two further particles were found.  In the four years 
between 1999 and 2002 the particles found were five, six, three and five respectively.  
However, following the first hearing on 24 February 2003, an eight-week period of 
monitoring took place.  This led to the discovery of 16 further radioactive particles.   
 
The first issue to be determined under the application was whether the petitioners 
were correct in commencing the action by way of judicial review under section 45(b) 
of the Court of Session Act 1988.  This states that: 
 
 “The Court may on application by summary petition… 
 
(b) order the specific performance of any statutory duty, under such 
conditions and penalties (including fine and imprisonment, where 
consistent with the enactment concerned) in the event of the order not 
being implemented, as to the court seem proper.” 
 
Counsel for UKAEA argued that judicial review was restricted to applications where 
the matters raised involved the exercise of administrative decision-making powers and 
where the exercise of that power was challenged.  As such, Counsel argued that this 
was an inappropriate remedy to ensure compliance with s7 of the Nuclear Installations 
Act 1965, which placed upon UKAEA a duty to secure that no occurrence using 
nuclear matter causes injury to any person or damage to any property arising out of 
the radioactive properties of the nuclear matter.  Essentially the argument pursued by 
counsel for UKAEA was that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court concerned the 
manner in which power had been exercised.  The Court would intervene where a well-
recognised complaint about the manner of the power being exercised could be made 
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out.33  But to seek to enforce the statutory duties of UKAEA by resort to judicial 
review dragged the Court, it was argued, into consideration of the merits of the 
decisions taken by the authority.34 
 
In giving judgment, Lady Paton rejected this argument.  In her view: 
 
“An application for specific performance of a statutory duty is a long-
established remedy, quite separate from an application to the general 
supervisory jurisdiction of the Court.  I also agree that this separate remedy 





As we have seen above, the petitioners did not seek, at this time, any order based 
upon human rights arguments.  This may well have been because of questions of fair 
balance between wider community interests and individual interests together with 
associated arguments concerning the margin of appreciation.  Nonetheless, they 
reserved their rights to proceed on the basis of human rights legislation following the 
conclusion of the interim applications.   
 
In response UKAEA suggested that arguments based on the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) were irrelevant.  This was because the first petitioner 
suffering damage was not a natural person so as to give rise to rights under Article 8 
of the ECHR.  On the other hand, the other petitioners could show no evidence of 
actual injury such as to found a case akin to that of Lopez Ostra v Spain.
36
  As for 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention, only the first petitioners could show 
the presence of particles on their land.  Even then, Counsel for UKAEA argued that 
this did not amount to damage to the land (see below) leaving only a claim for 
economic loss which was insufficiently severe to amount to any form of expropriation 
under human rights law. Lady Paton did not respond to these human rights arguments 
in any great detail given the preliminary stage of the proceedings.  Nonetheless she 
refused to exclude the possibility that there could be a case to answer in respect of one 
or more breaches of the ECHR.  Thus she refused to rule this out as irrelevant, and 
allowed that the parties could adjust their pleadings and make further submissions in 
any later stage of the case.  In the event, no such case came to a full hearing before the 
court. 
 
In relation to any personal injury, section 26 of the 1965 Act defines injury as 
including “personal injury and includes loss of life”.  There was no question of 
physical injury in these claims and Lady Paton cited Merlin as authority for the 
proposition that the 1965 Act was not intended to compensate for the risk of future 
injury. As is shown below, it was accepted that the beach contamination might give 
rise to fear of injury and it was accepted that identifiable psychiatric or possibly 
psychological illness which was caused by a wrongful act might be recoverable even 
if the common law had always restricted such claims as a matter of policy. Although 
Lady Paton accepted that stress and anxiety could be caused to those living in the 
vicinity of nuclear installations, where the 1965 was breached, she nonetheless felt 
that, of necessity, the law must limit such claims.  
 
This element of the judgment mirrors the later decision of the House of Lords in 
Grieves -v- F T Everard & Sons
37, a case in which workers developed pleural plaques 
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following exposure to asbestos. The pleural plaques were said not to constitute 
damage as the appellants manifested no neither symptoms nor health effects, and 
faced neither greater heightened susceptibility susceptibilities to other disease nor 
shortening of life expectancy. Arguments that anxiety about the presence of the 
plaques and increased risk of future asbestos related injury were equally ruled out as a 
species of damage; neither the pleural plaques nor the anxiety itself represented 
damage in law either singly or in combination. Finally, the appellant Grieve had 
developed psychiatric injury as a result of this anxiety but this claim too was 
dismissed on the basis that the risk represented by the plaques would not cause 
psychiatric injury in a person of reasonable fortitude. Arguments that the psychiatric 
injury was consequent on foreseeable physical injury
38
 were rejected on the basis that 
the foreseeable physical injury (asbestos related disease) had not occurred; Grieve 
simply worried that it might occur. 
 
Magnohard is consistent with this later ruling and with the earlier line taken in 
Merlin
39 that the presence of radionuclides, even in the bloodstream, may increase the 
risk of cancer but does not amount to personal injury per se. However, Lady Paton 
stressed that although she was not persuaded that there had been injury for the 
purposes of s7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, where elements of the claim 
were not based on the 1965 Act, as with the human rights claims, questions of stress 
and anxiety may still remain relevant considerations in the claims. Moreover, in this 
context, changes to the limitation period within which claims can be brought are 
significant. The earlier limitation period under the Paris Convention restricting the 
right to claim for compensation to within ten years from the date of a nuclear incident 
has been extended by the Amending Protocol to 30 years in the case (only) of claims 
for personal injury. This change is introduced by amendments to the limitation 
regimes in sections 7 to 11 of the 1965 Act by Article 17 of the 2016 Order and means 
that, if fears materialise and cancer does result from exposure, there is a greater 
likelihood of a claim.  
 
What amounts to an occurrence? 
 
There is one particular issue in Magnohard which relates to the changes introduced by 
the 2016 Order and this concerns the use of the word ‘occurrence’ in section 7 of the 
1965 Act. This is a word commonly used in insurance contracts (Richardson, 2002) so 
that its meaning and its clarification in the amended 1965 Act is of potentially wider 
significance (Abraham (1988). The section imposes a statutory duty to secure that no 
occurrence involving nuclear matter causes injury to any person or damage to any 
property, but the word “occurrence” has never been defined for the purposes of s7 of 
the Act.  It is clear from the wording of the Act that what is required is not merely that 
there is no occurrence, but that there is no occurrence causing injury or damage.  In 
Magnohard, Lady Paton consulted the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
“occurrence” finding:  
 




In her Ladyship’s view, the word “occurrence” could apply to at least two situations 
on the facts of the case, namely the arrival of a radioactive particle at Sandside Beach, 
and also the remaining of the particle on the beach in the sense that this is something 
which “takes place”.  It followed that when particles arrive or remain on the beach 
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there was said to be “an occurrence involving nuclear matter”41 for the purposes of s7 
of the 1965 Act.  This does not resolve, however, the question as to whether that 
occurrence causes injury to person or damage to property.  The petitioners pointed out 
that either personal injury or property damage would be sufficient for the purposes of 
s7 liability.  It followed that if the Court took the view that there was damage to 
property, the question of whether there was injury to person was academic. 
Nonetheless, as shown above, counsel for the petitioners did argue that injury to 
persons existed. The Scottish Environmental Protection Agency accepted that 
ingestion of particle or contact with the skin could cause injury.  This was said to be 
different to the radioactive contamination in earlier cases such as Merlin or Blue 
Circle.  In both of those cases there had been no suggestion of actual physical injury.  
Here the presence of that risk did give rise to rational fear of injury causing stress and 
anxiety albeit that no actual physical injury was demonstrated.  
 
That left the question as to whether there had been an occurrence causing damage to 
property.  Lady Paton judged that Sandside Beach had suffered physical damage in 
that there was a physical change to the area along Blue Circle principles, which had 
fundamentally altered its physical characteristics.  This was caused by the presence of 
particles with radioactive properties.  Damage was said to occur as soon as the 
radioactive particles were deposited on the beach.  Moreover, restriction of the use of 
the beach in consequence, together with warning notices placed on the beach, tyre 
track marks in the sand, and the removal of portions of sand were all evidence of a 
change in the physical characteristics of the land.  This was not of a de minimis 
character.  The judgment goes on to say that: 
 
“The most immediate source of the radioactive particles is a sea-based cache, 
such that the deposit of radioactive particles can neither be predicted nor 
controlled, together with the fact that the UKAEA cannot guarantee either the 
size or the level of radioactivity of particles deposited, or that every 
radioactive particle deposited on the beach would be detected and removed. It 
seems to me that the Sandside Beach is subject to a particularly unpleasant 
type of contamination which cannot easily be cured, and which makes the 
beach unattractive to any potential user or purchaser.”42 
 
This passage allowed the Court to distinguish Merlin, in that, in Merlin, no special 
equipment or cleansing measure was required to enable the householders to continue 
the use of their house.  In contrast, the Sandside Beach could not be used without very 
particular processes of land management, which were “hardly standard or 
commonplace”.43 
 
Having found however that there was an occurrence involving damage caused by 
nuclear matter, the Court refused an order for specific performance.  This was because 
the Court felt that s7 did not impose any clear statutory duty to monitor or to cure or 
clean-up any damage caused in breach of the section.  The Court felt that clearer 
wording in the statute would be necessary before it was appropriate for a court to 
order specific performance of a statutory duty.  However, the Court was willing to 
give a declaration in favour of the first petitioners that: 
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“UKAEA have failed and are continuing to fail to perform their statutory duty 
under s7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to secure that no occurrence 
involving nuclear matter causes damage to any property of any person…”44  
 
This was said to be an accurate statement of what was being allowed to happen and 
the court was willing to give a formal legal acknowledgement that this was the case.  
 
The notion of a ‘cache’ of radioactive particles which might over time migrate has 
proven problematic in practice. Potential liability for such a cache might inhibit the 
effective transfer of operational facilities or of land where, as is often the case, new 
build is taking place alongside former nuclear facilities (Temple et al, 2006). Not only 
is there a fear that incoming operators might face liability but if each deposit of 
radioactive particles constitutes an occurrence in the manner suggested in 
Magnohard, the limitation clock will be reset on each occurrence giving rise to very 
long tail liabilit  particularly now that limitation periods are extended. The 2016 
Order seeks to reverse the Magnohard view and limit liability to those operators 
responsible for the initial release of radioactive material. In the words of the Order,  
 
’if nuclear matter is in a place at a particular time as a consequence of an 
occurrence falling within section 7(1B) (including section 7(1B) as applied by 
section 7B, 8 or 9), 10(1) or 11), neither the presence of the matter in that 
place at that time nor any effect that the matter produces at that time is to be 
treated as a separate occurrence falling within any of those provisions’. 45 
 
This is a clarification which will be welcomed by the nuclear industry which worried 
that long-tail, legacy liability might hinder decommissioning and sale of facilities. 
Driven by commercial considerations, it is however an isolated example in the Order 
of an opportunity taken to clarify liability for personal injury and property damage 
caused by nuclear incidents. Elsewhere the Order seems content to leave the law 
dependent on existing case law, which, we have tried to show, is already overworked 
and obscure. 
 
New categories of damage 
 
While as originally drafted, the 1965 Act simply covered personal injury and damage 
to property, the 2016 Order, in line with the amending protocols, modifies the Act to 
introduce new categories of damage, which potentially extend the strict liability of 
operators (Tetley, 2006) There is no priority given to claims for different types of 
damage so that claims under the scheme are paid out on a ‘first come, first served’ 
basis. Because, as we shall see, compensation is available to re-instate the 
environment, there is a possibility of double compensation if damages are paid out for 
property damage but never deployed for that purpose, if at a later date the land is 
subject to re-instatement by a public authority. Section 13A(2) of the 1965 Act 
therefore allows that the court in determining the person’s claim in respect of damage 
to property must take into account, as affecting the amount of the person’s loss, any 
benefit or loss that arises from or in connection with measures of reinstatement. 
The cost of re-instatement measures is the first of the new categories of compensation 
where the environment has been impaired. The second is the loss of income deriving 
from a direct economic interest in the use or enjoyment of the environment. The final 
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category is the costs attaching to preventive measures together with any further loss or 
damage caused by such measures. For the first two of these categories some element 
of environmental impairment is necessary. Significant environmental impairment is 
not defined except that section 26(1) states that it does not include damage to the 
environment which is not sufficiently significant ‘to be eligible for compensation 
under the Act as damage to property, whether or not the part affected is property in 
respect of which such compensation can be sought’. It may well be therefore that the 
Blue Circle notion of ‘some alteration in the physical characteristics of the property 
which render it less useful or valuable’ will be employed as a measure of whether 
impairment has taken place. It may remain necessary to judge whether the degree of 
impairment is then significant for section 26 tells us what is not significant but not 
necessarily which eligible damage may then be regarded as significant.  
 
Looking at these categories in turn and in reverse order, preventive measures refer to 
measures taken after a nuclear incident which has created a ‘grave and imminent 
threat of nuclear damage’
46
. Such measures should be reasonable (in the words of 
section 11H, ‘appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances’) and aimed at 
preventing or minimising nuclear damage. The amended Convention allows that 
competent authorities might approve such measures but the transposition into section 
11H of the 1965 Act does not make provision for this. Given the multiplicity of 
necessary actions in the aftermath of a nuclear incident and the urgency which may 
attach, this seems sensible. Because all recoverable costs and compensation depends 
on a breach of duty by a licensee, for the avoidance of doubt, a duty is placed upon 
licensees to secure that no event arises which would create a grave and imminent 
threat of a breach of the other duties imposed by section 7 of the 1965 Act:47 
 
In relation to the second (middle) category of damage, it was apparently always the 
intention of the Act (Tromans, 2010) to make provision for compensation in the event 
of economic losses which are consequential upon damage to a property interest’ 
subject to rules  of remoteness of damage, rather than for simply pure economic loss. 
The Amending Protocols now add as an independent category of damage economic 
loss consequent upon damage to person or property but the Order makes no 
amendment to the Act, given the width of existing coverage of consequential losses. 
However, a new category of recovery for losses which are purely economic now 
arises where, following a nuclear incident, there is loss of income from an economic 
interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment. This category can only apply 
where the loss of income suffered is somehow not covered by the award of 
compensation recovered for personal injury and damage to property. A new section 
11G makes provision for compensation for certain classes of existing enterprises 
(though not employees) who would lose income, derived from directly, lawfully 
exploiting environmental resources, due to environmental impairment caused by a 
breach of the 1965 Act duties. Thus losses from fishing or shellfish harvesting or the 
loss of pasture on common land for hefted stock might all be covered under this head 
where the claimant can show that this activity was being lawfully pursued up until the 
time of the incident (Salter,2015).  
 
In relation to the first category of re-instatement, there is some experience of what this 
may include by reference to concepts in the EU Environmental Liability Directive 
(ELD).48 The purpose of the Directive is to establish a framework of environmental 
liability based on the “polluter pays” principle and the stated aim is to prevent and 





























































Journal of Property, Planning and Environm
ental Law
remedy environmental damage. Environmental damage in this context carries a 
particular definition and breaks into three parts: 
• Damage to protected species and natural habitats under EU law49  where such 
damage poses problems in reaching or maintaining favourable conservation 
status as a result of significant adverse effects. Nationally designated species 
and habitats may also be included under this head at the discretion of Member 
States.  
• Water damage creating significant adverse effects upon the status or 
ecological potential of a water body as defined under the Water Framework 
Directive.  
• Land contamination carrying a significant risk to human health as a result of 
introduction of substances preparations organisms or micro-organisms in, on 
or under land. 
All three of these heads can be taken to constitute ‘significant environmental 
impairment’, though the third and sometimes the second of these might equally well 
covered by existing notions of damage to property. Section 13A(2) therefore allows 
that a court in determining a claim for damage to property must take into account any 
gains or losses that result from measures of reinstatement. Equally, this is 
coveringapplication is to property in what might be regarded as the unowned 
environment. In the insurance case of Bartoline v RSA50 a distinction was drawn 
between claims for damage to private property and costs attaching to the remediation 
of environmental damage in the wider public interest (Thornton, 2007). Thus damage 
to protected species and habitats in the unowned environment will be caught where 
there is impairment of the environment if, in accordance with section 26(1), the 
damage caused would have been sufficient to have allowed recovery, if the species or 
habitats in question had constituted owned property. 
A strict liability system for the prevention or remediation of significant harm caused 
by operational activity is a familiar concept, the ELD having been transposed in 
England effective from 1 March 2009.51 Annex III of the ELD lists a broad range of 
occupational activities (largely activities subject to industrial pollution controls under 
EU laws) within its remit. Nuclear installations are not included in Annex III activities 
(Tromans, 2010) because, as Article 4(4) of the ELD makes clear, nuclear incidents 
are covered by the relevant international conventions.52. Strict liability for 
environmental impairment attaches to Annex III activities attracting responsibility for 
remediation of that damage irrespective of any fault or negligence on the part of the 
operator.  A fault based liability regime applies to other occupational activities where 
these cause damage to protected species and natural habitats.  Here the amendments 
made by the Order are modelled to some degree on strict liability under the ELD. 
However, there is surprisingly little case law as yet under the ELD so a number of 
questions relating to the nature of damage remain open. For example in a recent 
case53, the High Court ruled that damage was restricted to deterioration of the 
environmental situation and could not include the prevention of an already damaged 
environment from regenerating. That case as well as the main case to reach the 
CJEU54 relates particularly to the date of damage, an issue less likely to be pertinent 
in relation nuclear incidents. With some exceptions, this is true for many European 
jurisdictions in which ‘cases remain rare and sometimes non-existent in some 
countries’, which, when combined with the ‘imprecise language of the ELD’ has 
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given rise to a ‘patchwork’ of liability systems (Bio Intelligence Services, 2013). This 
is hardly a promising start for the legislative base of an international liability regime 
for nuclear incidents.  
 
Annex II of the ELD deals with remediation and places the burden upon the operator 
to propose remediation options. The competent authority will then determine the 
appropriate remedial option for the site in question. The amended 1965 Act now 
follows this pattern. Section 11A(1) allows that in the event of significant 
environmental impairment, ‘a qualifying public authority may make a claim under 
this Act for compensation in respect of the reasonable cost of relevant measures of 
reinstatement relating to that impairment.’  Under the ELD, where there is damage to 
water or to protected species and/or natural habitats the options should be based 
around the following remedial concepts: 
• primary remediation in order to return the site to its baseline condition; 
• complementary remediation consisting of off-site measures in situations in 
which primary remediation will not have the effect of returning the site to its 
baseline condition; and 
• compensatory remediation to account for the 'interim’ losses of natural 
resources and services in the period until the recovery of the site takes effect. 
 
The above concepts do not apply in the case of land damage. In such situations, the 
task is to ensure that the land ceases to pose any lasting threat to human health. The 
operator should take therefore such measures as are necessary to achieve this.  
Under the revised regime of the 1965 Act, no such distinction is made between water 
and land. It is clear that impairment of the marine environment is contemplated as 
section 11A(7) states that any reference to ‘environment’ should be taken to cover the 
‘environment within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, in or above the 
exclusive economic zone of the United Kingdom or on the continental shelf of the 
United Kingdom.’ Primary restoration of the environment so defined is clearly 
covered but it is less obvious whether complementary or compensatory remediation is 
covered. Section 11A(5) provides that a measure of reinstatement may include 
reinstating or restoring not only what has been destroyed or damaged in the 
environment, but also a measure ‘establishing the equivalent of what has been 
destroyed or damaged in the environment.’ Although we are told that any such 
measure must be ‘appropriate and proportionate’55  there is no definition of 
equivalence. It may be hard to see how compensatory damages, to account for interim 
losses as envisaged in the ELD, can be said to constitute a measure of re-instatement. 
The Government’s response to this issue in consultation was that the amendments 
would ‘not expressly include compensatory remediation’ (DECC 2012, 4). This does 
not seem to entirely rule out the possibility of such payments but it would seem that 
complementary remediation is what is intended by this mention of equivalence and 
that the cost of this would be recoverable in principle. 
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In a sense, it may have been felt that there was no need for any definition of 
equivalence since there is an elaborate regime to determine whether or not a scheme 
reinstatement is approved under section 11B of the 1965 Act. A claim must be made 
by a qualifying public authority.
56
 A public authority will qualify for these purposes if 
ordinarily in discharge of its functions it would ‘take, or arrange for the taking of, 
measures of reinstatement relating to that impairment of the environment.’57 In 
respect of a UK claim, this could clearly include the Environment Agency in England, 
or its equivalent in devolved administrations, as well as local authorities, both having 
powers to combat environmental impairment, for example under the contaminated 
land regime.58 There is a further category of qualifying public authority, however, 
whose functions include paying costs incurred by another public authority in 
reinstating the impaired environment. The most obvious authority here is the 
Secretary of State since (for example) under the contaminated land regime the 
Government ultimately underwrites the polluter pays principle in the event that no 
appropriate person can be found. This is problematic in that it is the Secretary of State 
who is charged with the approval of any measure of reinstatement. This may mean 
that the Secretary of State could end up potentially approving a claim lodged by 
government. This conflict is recognised in the Act and section 11B allows and 
independent person to approve reinstatement measures in such circumstances. 
Curiously, however, it is for the Secretary of State to appoint the independent person. 
The fact that the courts can review any determination under an appeal procedure 
contained in section 11D presumably rescues any such arrangement from breach of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights59. 
 
There is one final amendment to the 1965 Act which indicates how closely the 
provisions of reinstatement of environmental impairment are modelled on the ELD. 
This is in the form of section 11C which allows representations to be made to the 
Secretary of State in respect of measures of reinstatement for which approval is 
sought by an application under section 11B. The persons entitled under the Act to 
make such representations are the person whose breach, or alleged breach, of a duty 
(allegedly) caused the impairment of the environment, together with persons with an 
interest in or right over property affected by reinstatement measures such as would 
entitle that person to claim for damage to property. The Secretary of State may also 
invite other persons to make representations as regards the measures of reinstatement. 
The latter provisions begin to look similar to requests for action under the ELD 
whereby third parties with a sufficient interest in a particular site of damage may 
request formally that the competent authority take action. Under the Directive, 
requests must be supported by evidence of the environmental damage and response by 




The 2016 Order in amending the 1965 Act spends a good deal of its energy laying 
down a framework for preventive action and for the operation of new categories of 
compensation for environmental impairment and its consequences. The ELD with its 
underpinning ideas of liability for environmental impairment has clearly formed a 
reference point in shaping the new regime. Unfortunately, however, core concepts 
within the ELD are open to contest across EU member states (Bio Intelligence 
Services, 2013), meaning that the new categories of nuclear liability may themselves 
be open to doubt. In terms of existing categories of loss arising through personal 





























































Journal of Property, Planning and Environm
ental Law
injury and property damage, however, much less energy is expended in clarifying the 
law beyond a more detailed explanation of what amounts to an occurrence for the 
purposes of section 7 of the 1965 Act.. This leaves us dependent on a limited body of 
case law, which itself is hard to interpret and arguably inconsistent. Given the missed 
opportunity for statutory enlightenment as to what constitutes damage to person and 
property in the event of nuclear accident, further clarification may need to come from 
case law. Nonetheless we must hope that further, future case law will be very limited 
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